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The Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory is the argument that American government officials had advance knowledge of Japan's December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. Ever since the Japanese attack there has been debate as to how and why the United States had been caught off guard, and how much and when American officials knew of Japanese plans for an attack.〔''Pearl Harbor'', Charles Sweeny, Arrow Press, Salt Lake City, UT, 1946.〕〔''Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy'', Percy L. Greaves, Jr., Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2010.〕 In September 1944, John T. Flynn,〔http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v11/v11p431_Lutton.html〕 a co-founder of the pro-isolation America First Committee,〔http://spartacus-educational.com/USAflynnJT.htm.〕 launched Pearl Harbor revisionism when he published a forty-six page booklet entitled ''The Truth about Pearl Harbor''.〔 Several writers, including journalist Robert Stinnett,〔''Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor'', Robert B Stinnett, Touchstone (paperback), New York, 2001.〕 retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Robert A Theobald,〔''The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor – The Washington Contribution to the Japanese Attack'' (with Foreword by Fleet Admiral William F Halsey), Rear Admiral Robert A Theobald (USN Retired), Devin-Adair Company, New York, 1954.〕 and Harry Elmer Barnes〔.〕 have argued various parties high in the U.S. and British governments knew of the attack in advance and may even have let it happen or encouraged it in order to force America into the European theatre of World War II via a Japanese–American war started at "the back door".〔PHA Part 12, Page 17, Nomura PURPLE (CA) message, SIS no. 703, part 2 of 4, August 16, 1941, translated 19 August 41.|> search required using ''August 16'' > http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/magic/x12-001.html〕〔''Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933–1941'', Charles C Tansill, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, IL, 1952.〕 Evidence supporting this view is taken from quotations and source documents from the time〔''Design For War: A Study of Secret Power Politics 1937–1941'', Frederic R. Sanborn, Devin-Adair Company, New York, 1951.〕 and the release of newer materials. However, the Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy is considered to be a fringe theory and is rejected by most mainstream historians. ==Ten official U.S. inquiries== The U.S. government made nine official inquiries into the attack between 1941 and 1946, and a tenth in 1995. They included an inquiry by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox (1941); the Roberts Commission (1941–42); the Hart Inquiry (1944); the Army Pearl Harbor Board (1944); the Naval Court of Inquiry (1944); the Hewitt investigation; the Clarke investigation; the Congressional Inquiry (Pearl Harbor Committee; 1945–46); a top-secret inquiry by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, authorized by Congress and carried out by Henry Clausen (the Clausen Inquiry; 1946); and the Thurmond-Spence hearing, in April 1995, which produced the Dorn Report.〔 (Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Online page created 24 December 1996, begun by Larry W. Jewell.)〕 The inquiries reported incompetence, underestimation, and misapprehension of Japanese capabilities and intentions; problems resulting from excessive secrecy about cryptography; division of responsibility between Army and Navy (and lack of consultation between them); and lack of adequate manpower for intelligence (analysis, collection, processing).〔Holmes, ''Double-Edged Secrets''; Prange ''et al'', ''Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History''〕 Investigators prior to Clausen did not have the security clearance necessary to receive the most sensitive information, as Brigadier General Henry D. Russell had been appointed guardian of the pre-war decrypts, and he alone held the combination to the storage safe.〔''Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement'', Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, HarperCollins, 2001, p.269.〕 Clausen claimed, in spite of Secretary Stimson having given him a letter informing witnesses he had the necessary clearances to require their cooperation, he was repeatedly lied to until he produced copies of top secret decrypts, thus proving he indeed had the proper clearance. Stimson's report to Congress, based on Clausen's work, was limited due to secrecy concerns, largely about cryptography. A more complete account was not made publicly available until the mid-1980s, and not published until 1992 as ''Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement''. Reaction to the 1992 publication has varied. Some regard it as a valuable addition to understanding the events,〔 Review of Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, ''Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment'' (New York: Crown Books, 1992).〕 while one historian noted Clausen did not speak to General Walter Short, Army commander at Pearl Harbor during the attack, and called Clausen's investigation "notoriously unreliable" in several aspects.〔Wohlstetter, ''Pearl Harbor - Warning and Decision'', p.35.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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